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Evidence about commercial banks’ liquidity preference says the following about the loan market in 
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be effective at very high interest rates that are likely to be deflationary. The minimum rate is a mark-
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the observed stylized facts.
JEL Classification: O10, O16, E52, G21, L13
Keywords: excess bank liquidity, oligopoly loan market, monetary policy
Tarron Khemraj is Assistant Professor of Economics at the New College of Florida (The Honours 
College of Florida). E-mail: khemt73@gmail.com. This paper is a revised version of an earlier paper: 
“What does excess bank liquidity say about the loan market in Less Developed Countries?”  The 
paper has benefitted from valuable comments and suggestions by Professor Duncan Foley, New 
School for Social Research, and anonymous referees. I am responsible for any remaining error.
Comments should be addressed by email to the author.UN/DESA Working Papers are preliminary 
documents circulated in a limited number of 
copies and posted on the DESA website at 
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. The views 
and opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the United Nations Secretariat. The designations 
and terminology employed may not conform to 
United Nations practice and do not imply the 





Department of Economic and Social Affairs
2 United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-1428
New York, N.Y. 10017, USA




Introduction  .................................................................................................................................... 1
The stylized facts ............................................................................................................................. 2
Oligopoly banking and monetary policy.......................................................................................... 5
  The loan market ................................................................................................................. 7
  Indirect monetary policy and market structure ................................................................... 9
A calibration exercise .......................................................................................................................  11
Conclusion  ......................................................................................................................................  14
References .......................................................................................................................................  15
Appendix  .........................................................................................................................................  16Excess liquidity, oligopolistic loan markets  
and monetary policy in LDCs
Tarron Khemraj
Introduction
The financial liberalization hypothesis holds that allowing the market determination of real interest rates 
would mobilize savings and increase deposits (Fry, 1997a). Commercial banks—that are able to select good 
from bad borrowers, diversify risks, minimize transaction costs, etc—would then channel these savings to 
the best investors who earn the highest rate of return. Performing such roles of intermediation, banks not 
only increase the rate of capital accumulation but also increase productivity, thereby boosting the economy’s 
steady-state growth (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991).
However, in many less developed countries banks hold large quantities of excess liquidity—a large 
part of which is non-remunerated—in their asset portfolio (Saxegard, 2006; Khemraj, 2006; Fielding and 
Shorthand, 2005). For the remainder of this paper excess liquidity is defined as total bank liquidity minus 
required bank liquidity. The required liquidity (or reserve) ratio is set by the central bank in the individual 
country.
In spite of efforts to liberalize and modernize financial institutions, markets and instruments in 
LDCs, the banking sector is the most important source of financing in these economies and it is likely to 
continue to be that way indefinitely (Stiglitz, 1989; Singh, 1997). Therefore, the investment choice of banks 
can either retard finance’s role in growth or augment that role. Hence, examining banks’ liquidity preference 
in LDCs will emphasize important information regarding their behaviour in such economies.
This paper posits the hypothesis that banks in such economies require a minimum rate of interest 
in the loan market before they make a specific loan. A bank must receive a minimum loan rate that com-
pensates for risks, marginal transaction costs and the rate of return on a safe foreign asset before it makes 
a loan to a particular borrower. If the marginal borrower is unwilling to pay the minimum rate, then the 
banks accumulate non-remunerative excess liquidity1. This phenomenon is depicted by a liquidity preference 
curve that is flat at a very high loan rate. Therefore, non-remunerative excess liquidity and loans can become 
perfect substitutes at a very high rate of interest in the loan market. The paper will demonstrate that such be-
haviour is consistent with a loan market that is oligopolistic. Moreover, to present its case, the paper utilizes 
the industrial organization banking model of Klein (1971) and Freixas and Rochet (1999). The model will 
also be modified to suit the institutional characteristics of underdeveloped economies.
1  Why would commercial banks—operating under a liberalized financial environment—which take the safe foreign 
interest rate as given demand non-remunerated excess reserves? The main reason has to do with the fact that even under 
a liberalized setting a foreign currency constraint exists. The constraint is not induced by conscious policy—as in the 
days of financial repression—but emerges via the market. Even though rational banks would like to convert all non-
remunerated excess reserves into foreign assets, they cannot do so at every moment because there might be a shortage 
of foreign currencies in the domestic foreign exchange market. At the same time commercial banks cannot starve their 
long established customers, who typically received loans and must also participate in international trade, of scarce 
foreign currencies. To do so would mean the banks are exposing their loan base to financial stress.2  DESA Working Paper No. 64
A key implication of this study for policy is the postulation that commercial banks set the loan rate 
exogenously via a mark-up over the marginal transaction costs and the exogenous safe rate of interest2. It 
therefore means that a liquidity shock emanating from the central bank will not elicit a response in the inter-
est rate over the flat section of the banks’ liquidity preference curve. This is important for LDCs that have 
been implementing indirect (or market-based) monetary policy as a means of influencing bank credit—and 
ultimately consumption and investment decisions—by managing excess reserves and/or a short-term interest 
rate3.
Indirect monetary policy is often seen as a precondition for the adoption of inflation targeting—or 
at least a milder version of inflation targeting known as inflation targeting ‘lite’ (Stone, 2003)—in LDCs. 
Monetary policy shocks—characterized by shifts in the supply curve—are only likely to be effective at very 
high loan rates (above the minimum rate) when the liquidity preference curve is downward sloping. High 
interest rates, however, can contribute to economic stagnation even after significant efforts have been made 
in liberalizing and developing financial systems in developing countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts that depict the liquidity pref-
erence curves for nine developing countries. Section 3 develops the banking model that is used to derive the 
mark-up minimum interest rate. The model is also used to make theoretical statements regarding commer-
cial banks’ response to the central bank’s open market operations (or monetary shocks). Section 4 uses the 
derived minimum rate to perform a calibration exercise that can be used to make international comparisons 
among countries. Section 5 concludes.
The stylized facts
This section utilizes the technique of locally weighted polynomial regressions (Loess) of degree one in order 
to extract bank liquidity preference curves for nine less developed countries. The local regressions are ex-
tremely useful for deciphering underlying nonlinear relationships. The technique was first proposed by 
Cleveland (1979) and further developed by Cleveland and Devlin (1988)4.
Initially eleven developing countries were analyzed. Only countries that have been known to be per-
sistently inundated with excess liquidity were chosen. The Caribbean countries are all included in the work 
of Khemraj (2006), while the African countries were included in the sample of Saxegaard (2006). Egypt, 
which was eventually eliminated, was studied by Fielding and Shorthand (2005) who analyzed excess bank 
liquidity and political violence in that country. The other key factor determining the sample of countries is 
the availability of excess reserves or liquidity data. Data on non-remunerative excess reserves were obtained 
2  The same argument can be made about the deposit market and market for government bonds and Treasury bills. That 
issue, however, is beyond the scope of this paper and is the subject of further research.
3  Alexander et al (1995, p. 2) define direct versus indirect monetary policy instruments. Direct instruments set or limit 
prices (interest rates) or quantity (credit). The quantity-based direct instruments often place restrictions on commercial 
banks’ balance sheet. Hence, they are associated with financial repression. Indirect instruments, in contrast, operate 
through the market by influencing the demand and supply conditions of commercial bank reserves. 
4  Only a subset of observations within a neighbourhood of the point to fit the curve is used. The regression 
is weighted so that observations further from the given data point are given less weight. The subset of 
data used in each weighted least squares fit is αN, where α = the smoothing parameter and N = number 
of data points. A higher parameter, α, gives a smoother fit; but there also tends to be the lack of fit when 
α increases. If the chosen α is too low there can be a surplus of fit with many local wiggles occurring. 
Therefore, for the purpose of extracting the various non-linear liquidity preference curves a smoothing 
parameter of 0.4 is used. This choice follows closely the guidelines given by Cleveland (1993, p. 98). Excess liquidity, oligopolistic loan markets and monetary policy in LDCs          3
for Barbados, The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius5. A broader measure of excess liquidity—
which adds both non-remunerative excess reserves and excess liquid assets—was used for Guyana and 
Jamaica. Excess liquid assets typically comprise of domestic government securities in excess of the secondary 
reserve ratio. This broader measure was only available for Guyana and Jamaica.
For Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia the excess reserves data had to be calculated using data from the 
respective country’s central bank and from the International Financial Statistics (IFS). The required reserve 
ratio, which was obtained from the central banks, was used to calculate the required reserve series using 
deposit data from the IFS. The time-series of excess reserves was then calculated by subtracting the required 
reserves data from total reserves (the latter was obtained from the IFS). Unfortunately, excess reserves could 
not be found for Namibia or Egypt6. Nor could data on the required reserve ratio be obtained to enable the 
calculation of the excess reserves. Therefore, the data on total reserves, taken from the IFS, was used for these 
two countries. The period of analysis was chosen to maximize the sample size, but at the same time to enable 
to study post-liberalization liquidity preference. The data set for each country represents at least five years of 
post interest rate liberalization (see Appendix Table A, for dates of key financial reforms).
There are two clear tendencies in the figures: (i) the fitted liquidity preference curves tend to become 
flat7; and (ii) the flatness occurs at a very high rate of interest8. This means the demand elasticity for bank 
excess liquidity is perfectly elastic (or approaches perfect elasticity) at a high loan rate. Hence, commercial 
banks view loans and unproductive excess liquidity as perfect (or near perfect) substitutes at very high loan 
rates.
In the case of Guyana the bank’s liquidity preference curve becomes flat at approximately 14.5 
percent. This implies that a bank will not lend, on average, to the marginal borrower if that borrower cannot 
pay at least 14.5 percent. The same can be said for Barbados where the curve becomes flat at around 8.5 
percent. In the case of Jamaica, commercial banks will not lend to the marginal borrower who wishes to pay 
a rate below 17 percent. The marginal borrower in Uganda will find credit difficult to come by if he or she is 
unwilling to borrow at around 19 percent. In Trinidad and Tobago the curve becomes flat at approximately 9 
percent; while in Namibia the minimum rate seems to be approximately 11 percent. In the case of Tanzania 
the horizontal section occurs at around 15 percent. The Bahamas seem to have two minimum rate regimes 
at 6 percent and 5.6 percent. In the case of Zambia the curve tends to become less steep as the loan rate falls 
but never perfectly elastic.
Under a perfectly competitive loan market—an assumption that is implicitly made in the financial 
liberalization literature (see Arestis and Demetriades, 1999)—excess liquidity and bank loans should become 
substitutes at a zero loan rate. The fact that they are substitutes at a very high rate implies the banking sector 
5  Mauritius was eliminated from the study. There was not significant variability in the loan rate for Mauritius to uncover 
a meaningful relationship. 
6  Egypt was also eliminated because an unintuitive result emerged. The liquidity preference curve turned out to be an 
inverted U-shape.
7  It might be tempting to view the flat liquidity preference curves as indicative of a liquidity trap. However, that is not 
the case for two reasons: (i) the analysis uses the loan rate rather than the safe government bond/Treasury bill rate; 
and (ii) the curves tend to become flat at a very high rate of interest. There is a liquidity trap when money and bonds 
become perfect substitutes at zero bond/Treasury bill rate. 
8  The nominal loan rate was used throughout the analysis. Use of the real interest rate does not change the conclusion. 
Moreover, the data for each country demonstrate a persistence of excess liquidity in spite of the inflation rate in the 
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Data source: Bank of Guyana and IFS
Figure 1: 
Guyana (Loess fit) bank liquidity and the  
loan rate (quarterly data: 1997:1 – 2007:2)
Figure 3: 
Jamaica (Loess fit) bank liquidity and the  
loan rate (quarterly data: 1997:1 – 2007:1) 
Figure 5: 
Trinidad & Tobago (Loess fit) bank liquidity and the  
loan rate (quarterly data 1997:1 – 2007:1)
Figure 2: 
Barbados (Loess fit) bank liquidity and the  
loan rate (quarterly data: 1997:1 – 2007:2)
Figure 4: 
The Bahamas (Loess fit) bank liquidity and the  
loan rate (quarterly data: 1997:1 – 2007:2)
Figure 6: 
Namibia (Loess fit) bank liquidity and the  
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Data source: IFSExcess liquidity, oligopolistic loan markets and monetary policy in LDCs          5
Figure 7: 
Uganda (Loess fit) bank liquidity and the  
loan rate (monthly data 1999:1 – 2007:6) 
Figure 9: 
Zambia (Loess fit) bank liquidity and the loan rate 
(monthly data: 2000:1 – 2007:5)
Figure 8: 
Tanzania (Loess fit) bank liquidity and the  
loan rate (monthly data: 1998:1 – 2006:12)
in our selected economies (and very likely other underdeveloped economies also) is far from the case of com-
petition. This paper makes the realistic assumption that the banking sector is oligopolistic and not competi-
tive. As oligopolies, banks are able to mark-up the loan rate over an exogenous benchmark rate, transaction 
costs, and also take into consideration any risk of default associated with a specific class of borrowers.
Oligopoly banking and monetary policy
This section of the paper has three objectives: (i) present an oligopolistic banking model from which the 
minimum loan rate can be derived; (ii) use the model to demonstrate to what extent indirect monetary 
policy influences the loan market for different market structures; and (iii) explain the implication of the 









0 40 80 120 160 200 240



















-50,000 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000




















-400 0 400 800 1,200 1,600










Data source: Bank of Zambia; IFS6  DESA Working Paper No. 64
Banks are assumed to possess market power in the loan market and the government Treasury bill 
market. The monopoly banking model was first introduced by Klein (1971) and later applied to a liquid-
ity management model under uncertainty by Prisman, Slovin and Sushka (1986). However, an important 
difference between the model in this paper and earlier banking models is the fact that the government bond 
(or Treasury bill) market is not perfectly competitive as was originally postulated by Klein (1971), Slovin and 
Sushka (1983), Prisman, Slovin and Sushka (1986), and Freixas and Rochet (1999). While the government 
security market is likely to be highly developed and liquid in the advanced economies—hence the individual 
bank accepts this rate as given—it is not the case in LDCs where few institutional investors, mainly banks, 
dominate the purchase of Treasury bills. Therefore, the individual bank faces an upward sloping Treasury bill 
supply curve, thus making the bank an oligopsonist. If the Treasury bill market is uncompetitive, then the 
Treasury bill yield cannot be used as the exogenous reference rate which pins down the domestic term struc-
ture (as was the case in the papers cited immediately above). The discount rate is another candidate rate that 
can serve as the exogenous reference rate since it is clearly exogenous and under the control of the central 
bank. However, given the persistence of excess liquidity, this rate has not been very useful to signal monetary 
policy stance since banks seldom borrow reserves from the central bank.
As noted earlier, a key aspect of financial liberalization is the development of the money market in 
which the “independent” central bank will implement indirect monetary policy (IMF/World Bank, 2001; 
Fry, 1997b, chapter 6). To achieve this objective a primary market is developed for government Treasury 
bills, which a central bank can use to pursue open market operations9. In some countries such as Jamaica (see 
Peart, 1995) the central bank creates its own open market instrument. However, in most cases the Treasury 
bill auction system is the principal way of controlling bank excess reserves. Steps are then taken to develop 
the secondary market for Treasury bills and the interbank market for excess bank reserves.
In light of the very open nature of the economies under study (and LDCs in general), bank manag-
ers must always be mindful, subject to suitable adjustments for real exchange rate risks, of the prevailing rate 
of interest on foreign assets (which can be represented by the US Treasury bill rate or the LIBOR). Bank 
managers need to compare the international rate (adjusted for real exchange rate movements) with the pre-
vailing domestic Treasury bill rate and the loan rate (also adjusted for domestic risk scenarios and transaction 
costs).
The non-bank public must also consider the international safe rate and exchange rate movements 
when making investment decisions particularly in domestic deposit accounts. Banks will lose deposits and 
market share if the deposit rate becomes too low vis-à-vis the risk adjusted foreign rate. The existence of such 
an arbitrage mechanism in an unregulated open economy provides for a link between the asset and liability 
sides (of the bank’s balance sheet) in a banking model even though domestic financial markets are subjected 
to market power. Therefore, the foreign interest rate, which is clearly exogenous to the domestic economy, 
can be used as the exogenous reference rate in the modelling exercise. Hence, the model is applied in an 
open economy environment, thereby accounting for another important difference between the approach of 
this paper and the traditional banking model that is mainly presented in a closed economy setting.
Equation 1 is the representative bank’s profit function that is assumed to be concave in loans to the 
private sector (L); domestic government securities (G); foreign assets (F); and deposits (D). The i subscript 
attached to each variable signals the quantity of the respective variable held by the representative bank. 
9  See Alexander et al (1995) for a detailed description of the various indirect monetary policy instruments that are 
available to policy makers.Excess liquidity, oligopolistic loan markets and monetary policy in LDCs          7
Other key variables include  L r = the average loan rate;  D r = average deposit rate;  F r = rate of interest on the 
international security (the LIBOR for instance);  ( ) i c L = transaction and monitoring costs associated with 
making loans to private agents; ρ = the proportion of borrowers (where 0 1 ρ ≤ ≤ ) who are likely to default 
on their loans; and ψ = the probability (where 0 1 ψ ≤ ≤ ) that the government would fail to meet its debt 
obligations. The latter probability, for instance, is a function of the debt-GDP ratio or some other measure 
of debt sustainability. The bank’s balance sheet identity in which zD = required reserves (where z = ratio of 
total excess and required liquidity) is given by the identity equation 2.
i (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) L i G i F i D i i r LL r GG rF r DD cL ρ ψ Π= − + − + − −       (1)
i i i i i zD G F L D + + + =           ( 2 )
After solving the balance sheet constraint for Fi and substituting into equation 2, the profit function 
(equation 3) is derived.
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The paper follows Freixas and Rochet (1999) by assuming a Cournot oligopoly. In the Cournot 
equilibrium the ith bank maximizes profit by taking the volume of loans, Treasury bills, and deposits of other 
banks as given. In other words, for the ith bank,
* * * ( , , ) i i i L G D , solves equation 3. Equation (3a) denotes the 
aggregate quantity of loans, Treasury bills and deposits demanded, respectively, by the entire banking sector.
The loan market
It is now possible to derive a pricing equation for the representative bank in the loan market. Equation 4 is 
the first order condition after maximizing the profit function with respect to i L . The market demand curve 
the bank faces is downward sloping thus giving the elasticity of demand expression in equation (4b) in 
which  L ε denotes the banks’ elasticity of demand. There is a unique equilibrium in which bank i assumes 
* * / i L L N = , where N denotes the number of commercial banks that make up the banking sector. The ex-
pression  ( ) L r L ′ represents the first derivative of the loan rate with respect to L. As demonstrated by (4a) it is 
simply the inverse of  ( ) L L r ′ .
( 1 )( )( 1 )( ) ( )0
i
L Li F i
i
d
r L r L Lrc L
dL
ρ ρ
Π ′ ′ = − + − − − =       ( 4 )
( ) 1 / ( ) L L r L L r ′ ′ =           ( 4 a )
() / L L L r L r L ε ′ = ⋅           ( 4 b )
Substituting 4a and 4b into the first order condition yields equation 5, which shows that the loan 
rate is a mark-up over the foreign rate and the marginal cost of transacting,  ( ) i c L ′ . The mark-up is depen-
dent on the inverse of the product of N and the market elasticity of demand ( L ε ). As  1 N →  there is the 
case of a monopoly and the mark-up is highest, while as N → ∞  one bank has an infinitesimal share of the 
market; the equilibrium approaches the competitive state in which the mark-up approaches zero. The bank 
also increases the mark-up rate once the perceived probability of default increases (that is:  1 ρ → ).8  DESA Working Paper No. 64
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This equation helps to explain the existence of a minimum loan rate, at which point excess liquidity 
and private loans become perfect substitutes; hence, it explains the flattening of the empirical liquidity pref-
erence curve that was observed in the last section. Since the bank possesses the ability to choose a minimum 
rate, it will simply accumulate excess liquidity when the marginal borrower cannot pay the desired minimum 
loan rate. In other words, the bank accumulates excess liquidity because the marginal benefit from the ad-
ditional unit of loan is less than the marginal cost of that same unit of loan. The minimum rate also implies 
that the removal of interest rate controls (or financial repression10) will result in very high loan rates as banks 
behave more like theoretical oligopolies. High loan rates, especially after the liberalization of financial sys-
tems, have been observed in many developing countries (see Chirwa and Mlachila, 2004).
The Treasury bill market
As noted earlier the commercial banks do not take the domestic Treasury bill rate as given. With only a few 
large institutional purchasers of government securities, it is reasonable to assume that buyers do exert influ-
ence over the Treasury bill rate when they place bids for the security. In other words, banks face an upward 
sloping supply curve rather than a flat curve as is typically assumed in the literature. It is also a reasonable 
assumption to make since banks usually demand excess liquid assets over the stipulated statutory secondary 
liquidity ratio. Banks do find these assets desirable (hence the excess amounts) since they can collude and 
control the rate at which they bid for Treasury bills. Therefore, the Treasury bill rate can also be derived as a 
mark-up over the international rate.
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ψ ψ
Π ′ = − + − − =         ( 6 )
Maximizing the profit function with respect to  i G  gives the first order condition in equation 6. 
Substitute 6a and 6b into equation 6 to obtain the new pricing equation 7. (note:  G ε  denotes the elasticity 
of demand for Treasury bills) There is a unique equilibrium in which bank i assumes
* * / i G L N = , where 
N denotes the number of commercial banks that make up the banking system. Equation 7 postulates that 
the minimum Treasury bill rate at which a bank will bid for the security is denoted by a mark-up over the ex-
ogenous foreign rate and market-specific risk. The minimum mark-up rate increases as  1 N →  and decreases 
as N → ∞ . The minimum rate also increases as  1 ψ → , hence the bank will bid at a higher rate once the 
likelihood of a government default increases. This result is also consistent with the notion that a market Trea-
sury bill rate that is below the minimum stipulated by the mark-up rule will result in the bank accumulating 
excess reserves passively. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper and is left to further research. 
Another issue that is not taken up in this paper is the derivation of the deposit rate.
( ) 1 / ( ) G G r G G r ′ ′ =           ( 6 a )
( ) / G G G r G r G ε ′ = ⋅           ( 6 b )
1






+ = −            ( 7 )
10  Fry (1982) explains the main forms of financial repression as nominal interest rate ceilings for deposit and loan rates, 
directed credit to particular industries, and the expropriation by government of seigniorage by the use of high cash and 
liquid asset requirements and obligatory holding of government securities. Excess liquidity, oligopolistic loan markets and monetary policy in LDCs          9
Indirect monetary policy and market structure
It is interesting to see the extent to which indirect monetary policy influences the loan market when banks 
use a mark-up pricing rule to determine both the loan rate and the rate of interest on the government secu-
rity. The main task of indirect monetary policy in LDCs is the management of excess bank reserves through 
some form of open market operations using government Treasury bills, which the central bank holds as asset. 
The following arguments, however, are equally valid when the central bank invents its own open market 
instrument as in Jamaica (see Peart, 1995).
So far the paper has argued that excess liquidity is a structural phenomenon rooted in the oligopoly 
nature of banking. The task ahead is to now derive a theoretical equation to show the extent to which open 
market operations would influence the loan rate and hence bank credit and the real side of the economy. In 
particular, the objective is to analyze the effect on  L r when the central bank manages bank liquidity by vary-
ing the quantity of G. G is the policy variable; hence it is exogenous. The loan rate ( L r ) is the endogenous 
variable in the model. An increase in the sale of Treasury bills (G) is indicative of monetary tightening and a 
concomitant increase in  G r (that is: ( ) 0 G r G ′ > ); the opposite occurs when the sale of G declines.
It is possible to combine equations 5 and 7, which both have the common term  F r , to form equa-
tion 8. Taking the derivative  / L dr dG  will produce the monetary policy impact equation (equation 9), 
which measures the pass-through effect of monetary intervention. The loan rate is affected positively by 
a monetary contraction (increased sales of G) and negatively by a monetary expansion (decrease sales of 
G). Equation 9, moreover, provides an opportunity to simulate the impact of monetary policy for various 
banking structures given certain scenarios for elasticity and the probability of government and private sector 
default. In other words, given plausible values for  L ε ,  G ε , ψ  and ρ , how does  / L dr dG change for vari-
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In order to simplify the simulation analysis assume that  ( ) 1 G r G ′ = . This does not distort the result 
in any way. The assumption is made that  L G ε ε < . This is a plausible assumption for two reasons. Firstly, 
there are more buyers of government Treasury bills (bank and non-bank buyers) relative to the number of 
commercial banks. Secondly, the financial reform agenda has emphasized the development of money markets 
(of which the Treasury bill market is part) first as a launching pad for indirect monetary policy and the fur-
ther development of capital markets. Hence, money markets tend to have more participants (thus the higher 
elasticity).
There are many possible values that can be chosen for  L ε ,  G ε , ψ  , ρ  and N. However, the simula-
tion is done for N = 1, 2, …, 35. None of the countries in this study has a banking system with thirty-five 10  DESA Working Paper No. 64
commercial banks (see Appendix Table B). Figure 10 presents the simulation of equation 9 for the following 
values:  1 G ε = ,  0.2 L ε = ,  0.1 ρ = ,  (0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4) ψ = . The curves show different levels of values for 
/ L dr dG  (for the four different values of ψ ) over N. It is clear that the pass-through of monetary policy 
(  / L dr dG ) gets larger as the degree of competition rises. However, monetary policy becomes less effective 
as the probability of government default rises. Since developing countries typically possess financial systems 
with few commercial, the simulation results would suggest very limited pass-through for such economies.
Figure 11 shows the simulation exercise for  1 G ε = ,  0.2 L ε = ,  0.1 ψ =  and 
(0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4) ρ = . Again the monetary policy impact increases as the banking sector becomes come 
competitive. However, an interesting but plausible result emerges. The monetary pass-through rises as the 
private sector probability of default (ρ ) rises. The result implies that a central bank would be able to con-
tract the economy with relative ease during a crisis. On the other hand, the model also suggests the central 
bank might be able to stimulate the economy during episodes of financial distress. These results, however, 
might me more relevant for competitive banking structures rather than the third world scenarios that we are 
studying.
Figure 12 reports the simulation exercise for the values 1.5 G ε = ,  0.1 ρ = ,  0.1 ψ =  and 
(0.2,0.5,0.8,1.1) L ε = . In general the pass-through increases with N; however, as  L G ε ε →  the effect be-
comes constant for the relatively more competitive banking sectors. However, the extreme, but improbable, 
situation results whereby there is constant pass-through over any level of N when  L G ε ε = .
It is also possible to use a novel diagram to clarify some of the issues emanating from equation 5. Fig-
ure 13 illustrates how the minimum loan rate affects both the loan market and the market for bank reserves si-
multaneously. A solution in the diagram gives three endogenous variables— L r , the quantity of loans made to 
private agents (L), and the quantity of excess reserves ( R ). The excess reserves demand curve ( D R ) is down-
ward sloping and becomes flat at the minimum loan rate (
m i n
L r ). The reserve supply curve ( S R ) is vertical.  S R  
shifts outward or inward when the central bank pursues open market operations (changes G). When  D R = S R  
the reserve market is in equilibrium and it results in an equilibrium solution 
* * ( , ) L R r .
The loan supply curve ( S L ) is horizontal at the minimum rate. It is horizontal because the banks 
set the minimum rate exogenously and the public accepts the rate. Therefore, the minimum rate becomes 
the market’s supply curve. The public’s loan demand curve ( D L ) is downward sloping as the typical demand 
curve. At the point where  S L =  D L , the loan market equilibrium gives a solution 
* * ( , ) L L r .
Assume both markets are in initial equilibrium at 
* * ( , ) L R r and
* * ( , ) L L r . An introduction of an 
expansionary monetary shock would shift the  S R  curve outward along the flat liquidity preference curve. 
There is no change in the minimum rate (
m i n
L r ) or endogenous loan rate (
*
L r ). The result is the accumulation 
of a larger quantity of excess reserves (
*
1 R ). However, a contraction in monetary policy has a more dramatic 
effect in the model. The reserve supply curve shifts inward to  2 S R  and the quantity of excess liquidity de-
clines. If the contraction takes place over the downward sloping section of the  S R  curve, both 
m i n
L r  and 
*
L r  
would increase. The higher 
m i n
L r shifts upward the  S L  curve thereby diminishing the quantity of loans ex-
tended to the private sector. The conclusion, therefore, is an expansion of monetary policy in an oligopolistic 
banking sector would not be successful in stimulating private sector credit, but a contraction would tend to 
have debilitating effects on growth-augmenting credit to businesses.Excess liquidity, oligopolistic loan markets and monetary policy in LDCs          11
A calibration exercise
An exercise in calibration—in the context of this paper—would involve obtaining estimates for marginal 
transaction costs and choosing values (or obtaining estimates) for the probability of default, bank concen-
tration and elasticity of demand (given the foreign interest rate) in order to replicate the flat bank liquidity 
preference curves given by the stylized facts. This interpretation of calibration is in keeping with the outline 
given by Cooley (1996).
Given equation 5 a suitable proxy for each of the following—N,  L ε ,  F r ,  ( ) i c L ′ and ρ – must be 
obtained. Fortunately, it is fairly straightforward to obtain a reasonable proxy for N and  F r . N refers to 
the number of commercial banks that make up the banking sector (see Appendix Table B), while  F r can be 
Figure 10: 
Monetary policy effectiveness for different  
values of N and ψ
Figure 12: 
Monetary policy effectiveness for different  
values of N and  L ε
Figure 13: 
Monetary policy and the minimum rate
Figure 11: 
Monetary policy effectiveness for different  
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approximated by the three month LIBOR. It is not so easy, however, to get suitable estimates for the other 
three unknowns. Surprisingly there is a lack of econometric estimates of  L ε  for the countries under study. 
Hence, we have to make a reasonable assumption. Given the fact that the banking systems of Guyana, 
Jamaica, Barbados, Namibia and Trinidad and Tobago possess a very similar number of banks and very high 
asset concentration ratios, we can assume an elasticity parameter of below one. For the calibration exercise 
assume that  L ε = 0.5. In the case of Tanzania, which has twenty-three banks and a slightly lower concentra-
tion ratio, assume  L ε = 1.5.
Another key problem is obtaining a reasonable estimate for the marginal transaction cost [ ( ) i c L ′
]. Consequently,  ( ) i c L ′  has to be approximated by the average overhead cost. That is, total overhead costs 
(taken from the World Bank’s financial structure data set) divided by the quantity of credit extended to the 
private sector. The World Bank’s data, however, presents overhead costs as a ratio of total bank asset. There-
fore, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics total commercial bank asset and credit to private sector data 
are used to estimate the average overhead cost vis-à-vis the quantity of loans. Since the World Bank’s data on 
overhead costs for each country stops at 2004, the average is utilized for the purpose of calibration. Table 1 
presents the assumed values, estimates and calibrated results.
Table 1: 







(cost per one unit of local currency) 0.051 0.071 0.192 0.066 0.118 1.12 0.0563
Elasticity 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.5 0.5
Number of banks (N) 6 6 & 7 6 6 23 9 4 & 5
Probability – rho 0.16 0.39 0.02 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.36
Source: Author’s estimates.
The calibration exercise, therefore, seeks to choose a given value for the probability of borrower 
default, given our estimates and assumptions, which can replicate the flat interest rate threshold. Table 1 
also reports the probability—which should be seen as tentative—for seven countries. It was not possible to 
replicate a flat or near horizontal liquidity preference curves for two of the countries; instead of flat curves, 
U-shaped simulated liquidity preference curves were obtained.
Figures 14 to 20 represent the simulated liquidity preference curve using the Loess technique 
once more. The smoothing parameter of 0.4 was again utilized. The vertical axis in each figure represents 
the simulated or artificial loan rate, which uses the estimated values, assumed values, and the three month 
LIBOR. If the curve flattens it can be seen as being consistent with the minimum rate hypothesis. Unfortu-
nately, since visual analysis is utilized it is not entirely possible to replicate the exact horizontal threshold of 
the original graph. The results should also be interpreted with care given the difficulties in obtaining good 
estimates for each of the true parameters.
In the case of The Bahamas an average operating cost of B$ 1.12 was utilized—given the calcula-
tions and source of the pertinent data. It implies that on average every Bahamian dollar of loan extended 
cost Bah$ 1.12. Therefore, in light of the very high average operating cost, even a zero probability was not 
sufficient to bring down the horizontal section of the curve to its prior level. A similar situation occurred 
with respect to Tanzania whereby a zero probability could barely replicate the 15 percent threshold. Overall, Excess liquidity, oligopolistic loan markets and monetary policy in LDCs          13
Figure 14: 
Jamaica calibration (quarterly data: 
1997:1 – 2007:1)
Figure 16: 
Bahamas calibration (quarterly data: 
1997:1 – 2007:1)
Figure 18: 
Trinidad and Tobago calibration (quarterly data: 
1997:1 – 2007:1)
Figure 15: 
Barbados calibration (quarterly data:  
1997:1 – 2007:1)
Figure 17: 
Guyana calibration (quarterly data:  
1997:1 – 2007:1)
Figure 19: 
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however, the tendency for the calibrated liquid-
ity preference curves to become horizontal could 
be interpreted as supportive of the minimum rate 
hypothesis.
Conclusion
The paper argued that the phenomenon of excess 
bank liquidity gives important insights as to the na-
ture of the loan market in LDCs. Commercial banks 
require a minimum mark-up interest rate in the loan 
market before they lend to the marginal borrower. 
Such an interest rate stems from the oligopoly power 
banks possess in that market.
The paper also highlighted an important 
theoretical issue as it relates to the application of the theory of the banking firm to underdeveloped econo-
mies. It was noted that the banking model has to be modified to take into consideration the unique institu-
tional characteristic of no exogenous domestic rate of interest that can serve as the benchmark rate as is the 
case in the advanced economies. Interest rates are determined by oligopolistic interactions. Consequently, a 
suitable foreign interest rate has to serve as the exogenous rate in any modelling exercise. Therefore, by intro-
ducing the foreign interest rate the paper pitches the banking model in an open economy context.
Two important policy implications result from the finding of the perfectly elastic liquidity prefer-
ence curves. The first being the very high loan rate that is likely to occur after the loan market is liberalized. 
This follows from the fact that private oligopoly banks are free to set the loan rate at any level they might 
desire. As argued earlier, banks will mark-up the loan rate to compensate for marginal transaction costs, risks 
and the rate of interest on the safe external security.
The second policy implication is the ineffectiveness of indirect monetary policy over the flat range 
of the liquidity preference curve. As highlighted by the stylized facts, the downward sloping portion of the 
curves occurs at very high loan rates. Therefore, reserve shocks (that is shifts in the reserve supply curve ow-
ing to open market operations) emanating from the central bank can only have desirable effects on the loan 
rate (and hence alter consumption and investment decisions) when that rate is very high. This is because over 
the flat range of the liquidity preference curve commercial banks set interest rates exogenously of liquidity 
shocks emanating from the central bank. The high loan rate, moreover, is detrimental to output and employ-
ment creation in economies where the banking sector account for most business financing. Society and the 
policy makers, and the foreigners who advise the domestic policy makers, will have to decide whether indi-
rect monetary policy is so important that it is worth the cost of persistent strangulation of domestic private 
investments in productive activities.
Two important issues that are the focus of future research projects have been omitted in this paper. 
The first one is the implications of persistent excess liquidity for money market development (and the opera-
tion of these markets) in LDCs. The second has to do with why banks operating in liberalized economies 
such as Guyana, Uganda and Jamaica, for instance, have been seemingly unwilling to invest all non-remu-
nerative excess reserves in a safe foreign asset? Hence, what does excess liquidity say about the operation of 
the foreign exchange market in liberalized LDCs?
Figure 20: 
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Guyana Indirect monetary policy adopted in mid-1991.  Monetary policy focuses on  1. 
managing excess reserves as a means of controlling bank credit and meeting 
stable inflation objectives.
Interest rate controls jettisoned in 1991.  The bank rate and rediscount rate  2. 
determined via a competitive bidding system for government Treasury bills. 
Credit controls abandoned in 1991. 3. 
Cambio market system commissioned in 1990.  Cambio system was used to unify  4. 
the official exchange rate with the parallel foreign exchange market and create a 
floating exchange rate system.
Source: Egoume-Bossogo et al (2003).
Jamaica Jamaica’s first attempt at liberalization commenced in 1985.  However,  1. 
restrictions were soon reinstated.
Interest rates de-controlled in 1985. 2. 
Credit controls jettisoned in 1991. 3. 
Exchange control regime abandoned in 1991 and a flexible exchange rate  4. 
adopted in that same year.
Indirect monetary policy, or open market operations, adopted in 1985.  Monetary  5. 
policy is focused on managing excess reserves to promote business credit and 
stable inflation.
Source: El Hadj (1997).
Trinidad and Tobago Interest rate controls removed in 1993.   1. 
Exchange controls removed in 1991. 2. 
Exchange rate floated in 1993.  3. 
Source: El Hadj (1997).
Barbados Interest rate deregulation in 1991.  1. 
Source: Haynes (1997).
The Bahamas Deposit interest rate ceiling removed in 1994. 1. 
Source: Craigg (1997).
Tanzania Interest rate controls removed in 1991. 1. 
Credit controls removed in 1992. 2. 
Indirect monetary policy introduced in 1991.  Monetary policy utilizes Treasury  3. 
bills as a means of managing excess reserves.  
Source: Bank of Tanzania.
Namibia Interest rate controls removed in 1991. 1. 
Sale of Treasury bills in 1992 for managing excess reserves and achieving  2. 
monetary targets.
Credit controls eliminated in 1992. 3. 
Interbank money market established in 1993. 4. 
Source: Bank of Namibia Annual Report (2002).
Zambia Comprehensive interest rate liberalization in 1992. 1. 
Indirect monetary policy adopted in 1992. 2. 
Source: Simatele (2004).
Uganda A Treasury bill auction mechanism introduced to facilitate the market  1. 
determination of interest rates.
Treasury bills are used for open market operations in order to manage excess  2. 
reserves.
Market determination of the exchange rate in 1993. 3. 
Credit controls removed in 1993. 4. 
Source: Egesa and Abuka (2006).Excess liquidity, oligopolistic loan markets and monetary policy in LDCs          17
Table B: 
The number of commercial banks
The 
Bahamas Barbados Guyana Jamaica Namibia
Trinidad & 
Tobago Tanzania Uganda Zambia
1997 9 na 7 6 5 6 na na na
1998 9 na 7 6 5 6 na na na
1999 9 na 7 6 5 6 na na na
2000 9 na 7 6 5 6 na na na
2001 9 na 7 6 4 6 na na na
2002 9 6 7 6 4 6 na na na
2003 9 6 6 6 4 6 23 14 13
2004 9 6 6 6 4 6 23 14 13
2005 9 6 6 6 4 6 23 14 13
2006 9 6 6 6 4 6 23 14 13
Source: Various central bank websites and Annual Reports.
Table C: 
Asset concentration ratios—the share of three largest commercial banks
The 
Bahamas Barbados Guyana Jamaica Namibia
Trinidad & 
Tobago Tanzania Uganda Zambia
1995 0.95 1.00 1.00 na 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.76 0.86
1996 0.73 1.00 1.00 na 0.83 0.74 0.81 0.51 0.82
1997 0.69 0.98 1.00 na 0.82 0.73 0.72 0.52 0.93
1998 0.50 0.98 1.00 na 0.82 0.70 0.72 0.59 0.68
1999 0.50 0.98 1.00 na 0.78 0.72 0.72 0.64 0.69
2000 0.46 1.00 1.00 na 0.80 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.66
2001 0.66 na 1.00 na 0.83 0.75 0.68 0.57 0.62
2002 0.68 na 1.00 0.82 0.91 0.75 0.58 0.65 0.61
2003 0.61 na 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.62 0.65 0.58
2004 0.71 na 1.00 0.83 0.93 0.87 na 0.63 0.64
Source: World Bank’s financial structure dataset.